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Ripe for Refinement: The State's Role in
Interpretation of FET, MFN, and Shareholder
Rights

Lise Johnson1
Note: this paper was originally prepared for a workshop on Reshaping Investment Treaties,
supported by the Ford Foundation and co-organized by the Global Economic Governance
Programme, the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Columbia Center for Sustainable
Investment, and University College London.

Abstract
Over recent years, many states have taken steps to refine and modernize their investment treaties.
They have done this to, among other things, clarify what were often vaguely worded standards, insert
provisions on procedural and jurisdictional questions, and expand the express ability of states to issue
binding interpretations on certain questions. Together, these reforms can help narrow states’ exposure
to claims and liability under investment treaties.
Those reforms, however, are typically only included in newer treaties or model agreements. States
typically have legacies of existing treaties that are “old-style” and therefore are still exposed to claims,
litigation, and potential damages awarded under those agreements. To mitigate that exposure, states
can exercise the important powers they possess as “masters of their treaties” and use practice and
agreement to help shape interpretation of treaty provisions. This note focuses on this strategy. In
addition to setting out the general rules regarding state practice and agreement as a means of
influencing treaty interpretation, it (1) identifies three issues in investment treaty law—FET, MFN, and
shareholder rights—that may be particularly ripe for proactive efforts by states applying this
interpretive strategy; and (2) sets out a series of questions that aim to facilitate interstate efforts to
identify consensus on these controversial treaty provisions.

The Global Economic Governance Programme is directed by Ngaire Woods and has been made
possible through the generous support of Old Members of University College. Its research projects are
principally funded by the Ford Foundation (New York), the International Development Research
Centre (Ottawa), and the MacArthur Foundation (Chicago).
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1.

The Issue: Existing Treaties

Over recent years, many states have taken steps to refine and modernize their investment treaties.
They have done this to, among other things, clarify what were often vaguely worded standards, insert
provisions on procedural and jurisdictional questions, and expand the express ability of states to issue
binding interpretations on certain questions. Together, these reforms can help narrow states’ exposure
to claims and liability under investment treaties.
Those reforms, however, are typically only included in newer treaties or model agreements. States
commonly have legacies of existing treaties that are of the “old-style” and therefore are still
exposed to claims, litigation, and potential damages awarded under those agreements. This risk is
particularly acute given that tribunals have often permitted investors to “treaty shop” to obtain
favorable protections, and have also permitted investors to use the most-favored nation provision to
“import” more investor-friendly (or at least less clear) provisions from other treaties.
The question therefore is what to do about existing treaties? There are three main options:




Termination
Renegotiation (both of which can be accomplished through negotiation of a new, umbrella
treaty); and
Interpretation

This note focuses on interpretation, which can be pursued independently or in conjunction with the
other two strategies. Even if, for example, an agreement is terminated, it will likely have a survival
period during which time interpretations can also apply.

1.2 Interpretation: Exercising the powers of states as masters of their treaties
As explained in greater detail in Annexes 1-3, under both customary international law and the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), states are considered to be “masters of their treaties”, and
have the power to shape the interpretation of those treaties over time through their statements and
actions.
By taking such steps as issuing joint interpretations with their other treaty parties, exchanging
diplomatic notes, making unilateral declarations, and submitting briefs as non-disputing parties or
respondents, states can clarify uncertainties and ambiguities in treaty texts on a range of jurisdictional,
procedural and substantive issues such as the meaning of the fair and equitable treatment obligation,
the role of the most-favored nation obligation, the scope of consent to arbitration, and a range of other
issues. Under international law on interpretation of treaties, such acts, when evidencing subsequent
practice and subsequent agreement, must be taken into account by tribunals in disputes arising under
those agreements.
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Importantly, states can use their statements and actions to actively mold the agreements.
Interpretations need not necessarily reflect or be consistent with the original intent of the parties at the
time of signing the treaty. Rather, international law recognizes that states have the power to ensure
that treaties remain living instruments whose meaning can evolve over time.
But timing is important to the effectiveness and force of these interpretations. Actions taken during the
course of a dispute to establish subsequent practice or agreement may, rightly or wrongly, be viewed
by tribunals as improper tactics to avoid liability rather than legitimate efforts to clarify vague
standards. Indeed, the timing of interpretations has seemed to influence both the Pope & Talbot
tribunal’s critical view of the FTC interpretation of NAFTA Article 1105, and the United States’ view of
Ecuador’s efforts to secure common interpretation of the “effective means” provision. Both the FTC’s
interpretation and Ecuador’s attempt at a joint interpretation came after a tribunal had issued its
decision on liability in favor of the claimants, and both were questioned as attempts to interfere with
those awards.1
To avoid these concerns, it would be ideal for states to take steps to clarify the meaning of their
treaties on a prompt and ongoing basis, especially before disputes arise. 2 Consequently, this note
highlights certain issues that may be open and particularly ready for interpretation.
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2.

The Risks – Amounts, Claimants, and Claims

When thinking about the role of interpretation in clarifying provisions in investment treaties, an initial
question that is important to consider is what are the main risks that need to be addressed. Answering
that question requires an analysis of the
1. treaties that are in force,
2. quantity and type of investments and investors that they protect (including as a result of treaty
shopping),
3. standards and scope of protection that are granted, and
4. uncertainties that are capable of being addressed through interpretation.
Annex 4 contains more information on analysis of the first and second factors. The remainder of this
note focuses on the third and fourth.
2.1

Standards of Protection

As investment treaty arbitrations have been litigated and decided over the past 15 years, certain
issues have emerged as being particularly controversial and significant for the scope of claims and
likelihood of success. These include (1) use of the MFN obligation to expand the scope of
jurisdiction/import substantive standards of protection and alter dispute settlement provisions; (2) the
rise in investors’ use of the FET obligation to bring claims, and the expansion, at least according to
some tribunals, of the requirements that obligation imposes on host states; (3) the expansion of “treaty
shopping”; and (4) the ability of shareholders (including minority, non-controlling shareholders) to bring
claims seeking relief for harms to a locally established enterprise.
2.2

Standards Capable of Interpretation: Difference between Interpretation and Amendment

Importantly, many of the problematic issues regarding scope and standards of protection share a
common origin: vaguely worded treaty provisions. These vaguely worded treaty provisions have given
rise to problems for states and investors in the form of heightened uncertainties and litigation costs,
and have posed unique problems for states through expanded potential and actual liabilities. Investors
and tribunals have used vague language in order to stretch treaty provisions in ways often not
anticipated or desired by governments.
Yet the fact that many of the problems related to investment treaties arise from vaguely worded
provisions may actually be fortunate for states who have signed these agreements: Because many of
the most controversial provisions do not dictate clear answers, questions as to their meaning are
largely ones that can be addressed through interpretations, as opposed to needing to be addressed
through formal renegotiation and amendment.3
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3.

Provisions Open for Interpretation

As noted above, there are a number of provisions (1) that have given rise to expanded actual and
potential liabilities for states and (2) whose vague language may be ripe for further clarification. These
clarifications can bring “old-style” treaties in line with more modern treaty practice and better express
states’ understanding of their treaty commitments.
Of those provisions, this note focuses on three: (1) the MFN provision; (2) the FET language; and (3)
references to shareholder rights and remedies. For each, this note discusses the different approaches
tribunals have taken and the positions states have adopted in their newer treaties and disputes. It
then raises a series of questions to prompt inter-state discussion regarding the possibility for agreed
interpretations to clarify these provisions.
3.1

The MFN Provision

The MFN provision has been one of the most controversial provisions in investment treaties, with
states, investors, and tribunals contesting its meaning in myriad investor-state arbitrations to date.
Contrary to what treaty drafters might have expected, the provision’s main use has not been in cases
when an investor from Country X argues it was actually treated differently under the laws of the host
country than investors from Country Y. Rather, the MFN provision has been used to stretch and
expand the investment treaties themselves.
More specifically, investors have used the MFN provision to try to:






3.1.1

obtain treaty coverage over assets that, under the “basic” treaty, would not qualify as
“investments”;
import (and use ISDS to enforce) substantive standards of protection that are not included in
the “basic” treaty;
import (and use ISDS to enforce) substantive standards of protection that are broader than
those in the “basic” treaty;
import expanded provisions on damages and remedies;
import “more favorable” procedural rules regarding conduct of investor-state arbitration than
the rules provided in the “basic” treaty; and
import broader access to investor-state arbitration under the dispute resolution provisions.
Tribunal Decisions

Tribunals have been relatively open to some degree of “importation”, but differ with respect to what
types of provisions and rights can be imported.
In some cases the tribunal have stated that the MFN provision could be used to import, and use
ISDS to enforce, substantive obligations and standards of compensation contained in other
treaties:



MFN can be used to import the umbrella clause from another treaty (Arif v. Moldova, EDF v.
Argentina).
MFN can be used to import a more favorable FET provision from another treaty (ATA v.
Jordan; Bayindir v. Pakistan; Paushok v. Mongolia; MTD v. Chile; Rumeli Telekom v.
Kazakhstan).
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MFN can be used to import “effective means” provision from another treaty (White Industries v.
India).
MFN can be used to import the standard of compensation from another treaty (CME v. Czech
Republic).

Similarly, some tribunals have stated that the MFN provision could be used to access “more
favourable” dispute settlement provisions such as provisions that don’t require domestic litigation
prior to filing the claim.4 Decisions falling in this category include Garanti Koza v. Turkmenistan; Gas
Natural v. Argentina; Hochtief v. Argentina (majority); Impregilo v. Argentina (majority); Maffezini v.
Spain; National Grid v. Argentina; RosInvestCo v. Russia; Siemens v. Argentina; Suez v. Argentina;
and Teinver v. Argentina.
Tribunals have appeared most reluctant to allow investors to use the MFN provision to broaden the
definition of covered “investments”, expand the temporal reach of the BIT, or expand the scope of
investor-state arbitration when the treaty indicates that arbitration is only permitted for specific issues.
In MCI v. Ecuador and Tecmed v. Mexico, for example, the tribunals rejected the claimants’ attempts
to expand the scope of the BIT to cover events that took place prior to the treaty’s entry into force.
And in Telenor v. Hungary and Tza Yap Shum v. Peru, the tribunals rejected the investors’ attempts to
use the MFN provision to broaden the dispute resolution provision beyond disputes relating to the
amount of compensation due for expropriation (cf. RosInvestCo v. Russia [reaching the opposite
conclusion and permitting importation for this purpose]).5
Nevertheless, arbitrators and tribunals have expressed different opinions on even these issues,
leaving doors open for future litigation and potential acceptance of such MFN-based arguments.
3.1.2

State Positions

Various states have objected to or noted their disagreement with each of these uses of the MFN
provision.
Treaty practice
Sometimes states have expressed this disagreement in the context of treaty negotiations. For
example, in the US-DR-CAFTA, a note that was included as part of the negotiating history reflects the
states’ understanding that MFN provision does not apply to international dispute resolution
mechanisms. That note stated:
The Most-Favored-Nation Treatment Article of this Agreement is expressly limited in its
scope to matters ‘with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion,
management, conduct operation and sale or other dispositions of investments.’ The
Parties share the understanding and intent that this clause does not encompass
international dispute resolution mechanisms such as those contained in Section C of this
chapter, and therefore could not reasonably lead to a conclusion similar to that of the
Maffezini case.6
More expressly, in the Colombia-Switzerland BIT the treaty parties specifically barred application
of MFN provision to dispute settlement mechanisms. The BIT states:
For greater certainty, it is further understood that the most favourable nation treatment … does not
encompass mechanisms for the settlement of investment disputes provided for in other international
agreements concluded by the Party concerned.7
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The January 2015 version of the investment chapter being negotiated in the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) likewise prevents use of the MFN provision to import dispute settlement
mechanisms from other treaties, stating:
For greater certainty, the treatment referred to in this Article does not encompass
international dispute resolution procedures or mechanisms such as those included in
Section B.8
While these provisions add some clarity regarding the scope of the MFN provision, they leave open
certain questions such as whether the MFN provision can be used to import substantive standards
and arbitrate disputes regarding those substantive standards.
Those questions are addressed in the recently negotiated CETA. In that agreement, Canada and
Europe specified that the treaty’s MFN provision does not permit importation of procedural or
substantive standards. The treaty makes clear that, by the mere act of giving investors from one
state the ability to benefit from certain procedural or substantive protections under one investment
treaty, the government does not give those investors “treatment” capable of being more or less
favorable than what is provided under another investment treaty. The text of the CETA states:
For greater certainty, the “treatment” referred to in Paragraph 1 and 2 does not include
investor-to-state dispute settlement procedures provided for in other international
investment treaties and other trade agreements. Substantive obligations in other
international investment treaties and other trade agreements do not in themselves
constitute “treatment”, and thus cannot give rise to a breach of this article, absent
measures adopted by a Party pursuant to such obligations.9
Submissions as respondents and non-disputing state parties
AIn the contest of disputes, a number of states have similarly objected to interpretations of the MFN
provision that read the clause as allowing importation of other treaty rights and protections.10
Argentina

In EDF v. Argentina, Argentina argued “that the MFN Clause is
unable to incorporate ‘umbrella clauses’ because the question of
whether there has been a breach of such standards does not arise
‘in the sense of [the Argentina-France BIT].’”11

Bolivia

In Guarachi v. Bolivia, Bolivia argued that the “effective means
standard may not be imported into the United-Kingdom-Bolivia BIT
by way of the MFN clause, as this would also require the relevant
negotiation process to be incorporated and applied to investors from
the United Kingdom. Therefore, the effect of the negotiation
prerequisite cannot be escaped merely by resorting to the MFN
clause, especially where the purpose of such clause is to avert
discriminatory treatment by reason of investors’ nationality.”12

Ecuador

In Perenco v. Ecuador, Ecuador rejected “any suggestion that the
Treaty’s most favoured nation clause permits Perenco to borrow the
provision of any other BIT signed by Ecuador that offers protections
to indirectly controlled companies of the other State party. They
assert[ed] that such a claim merely begs the question, because the
MFN clause only applies to ‘nationals or companies’ within the
meaning of the Treaty…. Perenco’s argument that Article 5
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statements regarding the underlying facts and law, and have also applied rather low thresholds for
finding liability.
One factor that has influenced some tribunals’ interpretations of the FET obligation is their view of the
relation between the FET standard and the minimum standard of treatment (MST) under customary
international law (MST). The MST is a floor below which conduct is not to fall, and is based on the
general and consistent practices of states “accepted as law.”19 Establishment of the MST requires two
elements: (1) evidence of state practice of sufficient “density, in terms of uniformity, extent and
representativeness;”20 and (2) opinio juris, meaning that states follow the practice out of a sense of
legal duty.
There are four general approaches tribunals have taken regarding the relationship between the FET
obligation and the floor set by the MST. The first is to hold that the FET standard does not simply
codify the MST, but is an autonomous standard that is independent of and goes beyond the
MST.
Enron Creditors Recovery Corporation (formerly Enron Corporation) and Ponderosa Assets,
L.P. v. Argentina: “It might well be that in some circumstances where the international
minimum standard is sufficiently elaborate and clear, fair and equitable treatment might be
equated with it. But in other more vague circumstances, the fair and equitable standard may be
more precise than its customary international law forefathers. This is why the Tribunal
concludes that the fair and equitable standard, at least in the context of the Treaty applicable
to this case, can also require a treatment additional to, or beyond that of, customary law. The
very fact that recent FTC interpretations or investment treaties have purported to change the
meaning or extent of the standard only confirms that those specific instruments aside, the
standard is or might be a broader one.”21
Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentina: “The Tribunal
sees no basis for equating principles of international law with the minimum standard of
treatment. First, the reference to principles of international law supports a broader reading that
invites consideration of a wider range of international law principles than the minimum standard
alone. Second, the wording of Article 3 requires that the fair and equitable treatment conform to
the principles of international law, but the requirement for conformity can just as readily set a
floor as a ceiling on the Treaty’s fair and equitable treatment standard. Third, the language of
the provision suggests that one should also look to contemporary principles of international
law, not only to principles from almost a century ago.”22
Perenco v. Ecuador: “With respect to the general approach to be taken to the meaning of the
fair and equitable treatment standard, Article 4 of the Treaty requires a Contracting Party to
accord “[fair] and equitable treatment, in accordance with the principles of international law”.
This particular formulation of the standard is not tethered to the international minimum
standard of treatment under customary international law.”23
The second approach is to hold that the FET obligation is the same as the MST owed to aliens
under customary international law. Under this view, when including the FET obligation in their
treaties, states were merely incorporating the MST standard. The FET obligation encompasses the
MST but does not go beyond it. Notably, there is evidence that such practice of expressly tethering
the FET standard to the MST standard will lead the tribunal to interpret the scope of the FET
obligation (and potential liability thereunder) as being narrower than under a treaty without such an
express reference. Statistics gathered by UNCTAD suggest that inclusion of language aligning the
FET obligation to the MST can improve states’ chances of successfully defending claims.24
Decisions viewing the FET obligation as being tied and limited to the MST include:
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Glamis Gold v. United States: “[T]o violate the customary international law minimum standard
of treatment codified in Article 1105 of the NAFTA, an act must be sufficiently egregious and
shocking—a gross denial of justice, manifest arbitrariness, blatant unfairness, a complete lack
of due process, evident discrimination, or a manifest lack of reasons—so as to fall below
accepted international standards and constitute a breach of Article 1105(1).”25
Apotex Holdings and Apotex Inc. v. United States: “For all these reasons, the Tribunal
concludes that the Claimants have not established the existence of the specific procedural
rights required by customary international law … As the Party bearing the legal burden of
establishing its case, this determination would suffice to dismiss the Claimants’ case under
NAFTA Article 1105(1).”26
Mobil v. Canada: What the foreign investor is entitled to under Article 1105 is that any changes
are consistent with the requirements of customary international law on fair and equitable
treatment. Those standards are set, as we have noted above, at a level which protects against
egregious behaviour. It is not the function of an arbitral tribunal established under NAFTA to
legislate a new standard which is not reflected in the existing rules of customary international
law. The Tribunal has not been provided with any material to support the conclusion that the
rules of customary international law require a legal and business environment to be maintained
or set in concrete.27

The third approach is to indicate that the difference between FET and the MST is not significant in
practice. To some extent, this has arisen from the view that the “minimum” standard is an evolving
concept that has expanded over time to approximate if not subsume what might previously have only
been barred under a more exacting FET standard.28 It has also resulted from the fact that tribunals
have not always strictly required claimants to prove the existence of state practice and opinio juris on
a specific issue.29








CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina: “While the choice between requiring a higher
treaty standard and that of equating it with the international minimum standard might have
relevance in the context of some disputes, the Tribunal is not persuaded that it is relevant in
this case. In fact, the Treaty standard of fair and equitable treatment and its connection with
the required stability and predictability of the business environment, founded on solemn legal
and contractual commitments, is not different from the international law minimum standard and
its evolution under customary law.”30
Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. Ecuador: “The Tribunal is of the opinion
that in the instant case the Treaty standard is not different from that required under
international law concerning both the stability and predictability of the legal and business
framework of the investment. To this extent the Treaty standard can be equated with that
under international law as evidenced by the opinions of the various tribunals cited above. It is
also quite evident that the Respondent’s treatment of the investment falls below such
standards.”31
Duke Energy Electroquil Partners and Electroquil S.A. v. Ecuador: “'[T]he minimum
requirement to satisfy [the FET] standard has evolved and the Tribunal considers that its
content is substantially similar whether the terms are interpreted in their ordinary meaning, as
required by the Vienna Convention, or in accordance with customary international law.’ The
Tribunal concurs with this statement and with the conclusion that the standards are essentially
the same.”32
Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v. Tanzania: “[T]he Arbitral Tribunal also accepts, as found
by a number of previous arbitral tribunals and commentators, that the actual content of the
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treaty standard of fair and equitable treatment is not materially different from the content of the
minimum standard of treatment in customary international law.”33
Rumeli Telekom A.S. and Telsim Mobil Telekomunikasyon Hizmetleri A.S. v. Kazakhstan: “The
only aspect on which the parties differ is that for Respondent, the concept does not raise the
obligation upon Respondent beyond the international minimum standard of protection. The
Arbitral Tribunal considers that this precision is more theoretical than real. It shares the view of
several ICSID tribunals that the treaty standard of fair and equitable treatment is not materially
different from the minimum standard of treatment in customary international law.” 34

The fourth is to not address the relationship, or to draw no clear conclusion about the relationship.
3.2.2

State Positions

Treaty practice
In their newer treaties and models, a number of states, including various Latin American countries,
have inserted language expressly indicating that the fair and equitable treatment means the
minimum standard of treatment under customary international law. The Central America-Mexico
FTA is one of many examples. It states:
Artículo 11.3: Nivel Mínimo de Trato
1. Cada Parte otorgará a las inversiones de los inversionistas de la otra Parte, un trato acorde con el
derecho internacional consuetudinario, incluido trato justo y equitativo, así como protección y
seguridad plenas dentro de su territorio.
2. Para mayor certeza, el párrafo 1 prescribe que el nivel mínimo de trato a los extranjeros según el
derecho internacional consuetudinario es el nivel mínimo de trato que se le otorgará a las inversiones
de los inversionistas de la otra Parte. Los conceptos de "trato justo y equitativo" y "protección y
seguridad plenas" no requieren un tratamiento adicional o más allá de aquel exigido por ese nivel, y
no crean derechos sustantivos adicionales. La obligación en el párrafo 1 de otorgar:
(a) "trato justo y equitativo" incluye, pero no está limitado a, la obligación de no denegar justicia en
procedimientos penales, civiles o contencioso administrativos, de conformidad con el principio de
debido proceso incorporado en los principales sistemas legales del mundo; y
(b) "protección y seguridad plenas" exige a una Parte otorgar el nivel de protección policial que es
exigido por el derecho internacional consuetudinario.
3. La determinación que se ha violado otra disposición de este Tratado o de otro acuerdo
internacional, no establece que se ha violado este Artículo.
4. Con respecto a este Artículo, el nivel mínimo de trato a los extranjeros del derecho internacional
consuetudinario se refiere a todos los principios del derecho internacional consuetudinario que
protegen los derechos e intereses económicos de los extranjeros.
The January 2015 version of the TPP is another example. It states:
For greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of
treatment of aliens as the standard of treatment to be afforded to covered investments. The concepts
of “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and security” do not require treatment in addition
to or beyond that which is required by that standard, and do not create additional substantive rights.
….35
The TPP also contains an annex providing additional information on the meaning of the customary
international law MST.
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Submissions as respondents and as non-disputing state parties
States have also clarified the relationship between the FET and MST in their pleadings. Submissions
made by North and South American states on that issue include the following:
Argentina

The reference to “‘Fair and Equitable Treatment according to the
Principles of International Law’” is a reference to and coextensive
with the “minimum standard of objective treatment” under
“customary international law” and not an “autonomous and
independent standard.” EDF International
S.A., SAUR International S.A. and León Participaciones
Argentinas S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23,
award (June 11, 2012), para. 343 (noting the respondent’s position)
(link not express in the treaty)

Canada

“[T]he Note of Interpretation rejects the interpretation of ‘fair and
equitable treatment’ … as a standard of fairness autonomous of the
customary international law minimum standard of treatment. It
confirms that customary international law is the applicable source of
law to determine the minimum standard of treatment under Article
1105(1), and that ‘Article 1105 requires no more, nor less, than the
minimum standard of treatment demanded by customary
international law.'” V.G. Gallo v. Government of Canada, PCA
Case No. 55798, respondent’s counter-memorial (June 29, 2010),
262.
para.
(link not express in the treaty)

Ecuador

“The fair and equitable treatment provision also does not create
new, treaty-based standards, but merely incorporates or references
the minimum standard of treatment under customary international
law.” Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Corporation v.
Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-23, track 2
counter-memorial on the merits of the Republic of Ecuador
(February 18, 2013), para. 387.
(link not express in treaty)

El Salvador

“The text of CAFTA makes it clear that ‘Fair and Equitable
Treatment’ is a ‘floor’ or ‘bottom’ to the acceptable treatment of
foreign investments – treatment that does not fall below this
minimum standard does not give rise to a treaty violation, even if
such treatment may not be considered ideal by a party or a tribunal.”
Railroad Development Corporation v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID
Case No. ARB/07/23, submission by non-disputing state party, El
Salvador (January 1, 2012), para. 3.
(link express in the treaty)

Guatemala

“Article 10.5 of CAFTA limits the Parties’ fair and equitable
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treatment obligation to the minimum standard of treatment under
customary international law. A claimant alleging a violation of the
minimum standard of treatment under customary law bears two
burdens: first, as examined in this section, it must prove as a matter
of law that this particular standard of treatment is within the scope of
the minimum standard of treatment under customary international
law; second, … it must prove as a matter of fact that the respondent
State violated that particular standard of treatment.” Railroad
Development Corporation v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case
No. ARB/07/23, respondent’s counter-memorial on the merits
(October 5, 2010), para. 346.
(link express in the treaty)
Honduras

“El trato justo y equitativo’ solamente se menciona con el rango
de un ‘concepto’ que esta incluido en el ’Nivel Minimo de Trato.’ El
segundo parrafo del [CAFTA] Articulo 10.5 establece claramente
que este concepto de ‘trato justo y equitativo’ no puede ir mas alla
del nivel minimo de trato a los extranjeros segun el derecho
intemacional consuetudinario.” Railroad Development Corporation
v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, submission
by non-disputing state party, Honduras (Jan. 1, 2012), para. 5.
(link express in the treaty)

United
States

Under the NAFTA, “ ‘[F]air and equitable treatment’ … do[es] not
require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by
the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of
aliens.’” ADF Group Inc. v. United States of America, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/00/1, US counter-memorial on competence & liability
(November 29, 2001), p. 50.
(link not express in the treaty)
The provisions of the CAFTA-DR demonstrate the “Parties’ express
intent to incorporate the minimum standard of treatment required by
customary international law as the standard for treatment in
CAFTA-DR Article 10.5. Furthermore, they express an intent to
guide the interpretation of that Article by the Parties’ understanding
of customary international law, i.e., the law that develops from the
practices and opinio juris of States themselves, rather than by
interpretations of similar but differently worded treaty provisions.
The burden is on the claimant to establish the existence and
applicability of a relevant obligation under customary international
law that meets these requirements.” Railroad Development
Corporation v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23,
submission by non-disputing state party, United States of America
(January 31, 2012), para. 3.
(link express in the treaty)
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In addition to making submissions on the link between the FET and MST, states have also informed
tribunals of their view of the content of those standards:

Argentina

“Respondent … argues that customary international law recognizes
neither legitimate expectations nor legal stability as essential
elements to the Fair and Equitable Treatment standard. (See,
Respondent‘s Rejoinder, at paras. 249-50, 255). Respondent asserts
that such broad interpretation extending to the protection of
legitimate expectation constitutes a legislative expansion inconsistent
with the contracting parties’ intentions as well as the principles of
treaty interpretation under Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna
Convention.” EDF International S.A., SAUR International S.A. and
Leon Participaciones Argentinas S.A. v. Argentina Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/23, (award June 11, 2012), para. 359
(paraphrasing respondent’s arguments)

Canada

The FET/MST obligation sets an “absolute minimum ‘floor below
which treatment of foreign investors must not fall.” V.G. Gallo v.
Government of Canada, respondent’s counter-memorial (June 29,
2010), para. 263.
The FET/MST obligation “does not require the protection of legitimate
expectations or transparency.” V.G. Gallo, respondent’s counter
memorial, p. 95, heading D.1.
Claimants have “submitted no evidence of practice of the three
NAFTA Parties regarding the protection of legitimate expectations, let
alone evidence of practice by any of the other 189 members of the
United Nations, as would be necessary to prove that a rule of custom
crystallized through widespread and consistent practice undertaken
out of a sense of legal obligation.” Mobil Investments Canada Inc.
and Murphy Oil Corporation v. Government of Canada, respondent’s
reply post-hearing brief (January 31, 2011), para. 98.

Guatemala

The FET/MST obligation does not “ ‘create additional substantive
rights.’ ” Railroad Development Corporation v. Republic
of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, respondent’s countermemorial (October 5, 2010), para. 348 (internal citations omitted).
The claimant has not established, and the State does not accept that
the FET/MST obligation includes a general obligation not to act
arbitrarily (para. 397), to act transparently (para. 409), or to protect
investors’ “legitimate expectations” (paras. 424-428). Railroad
Development Corporation, respondent’s counter-memorial.

El Salvador

“The text of CAFTA makes it clear that ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’
is a ‘floor’ or ‘bottom’ to the acceptable treatment of foreign
investments – treatment that does not fall below this minimum
standard does not give rise to a treaty violation, even if such

Page 15 of 35
Ripe for Refinement: The State's Role in Interpretation of FET, MFN, and Shareholder Rights – Lise Johnson
© April 2015 / GEG WP101.

The Global Economic Governance Programme
University of Oxford

treatment may not be considered ideal by a party or a tribunal.”
Railroad Development Corporation v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID
Case No. ARB/07/23, submission by non-disputing state party, El
Salvador (January 1, 2012), para. 3.
The FET/MST obligation does not “ ‘create additional substantive
rights.’ ” Railroad Development Corporation, submission by nondisputing state party, El Salvador, para. 3 (internal citations omitted).
In El Salvador's view, to violate the minimum standard of treatment
under customary international law included in CAFTA Article 10.5, a
measure to be able to the State “must be sufficiently egregious and
shocking – a gross denial of justice, manifest arbitrariness, blatant
unfairness, a complete lack of due process, evident discrimination, or
a manifest lack of reasons – so as to fall below accepted
international standards… Conversely, … the requirement to provide
‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ under CAFTA Article 10.5 does not
include obligation of transparency, reasonableness, refraining from
mere arbitrariness, or not frustrating investors’ legitimate
expectations.” Railroad Development Corporation, submission by
non-disputing state party, El Salvador, paras. 6-7.
Honduras

“Debido al origen de 'Nivel Minimo de Trato' en el derecho
internacional consuetudinario, como un 'piso' absoluto que
complementa la obligacion de los Estados de otorgar a los
extranjeros al menos el mismo nivel de trato que los Estados otorgan
a sus propios nacionales, solam.ente acciones de caracter chocante,
excesivo, ultrajante, de parte de un Estado, pueden violar el nivel
minimo de trato, incluyendo el trato justo y equitativo como un
concepto incluido en el nivel minimo de trato.
“La Republica de Honduras considera validos los siguientes
ejemplos especificos de conducta que puede violar el nivel mfnimo
de trato: una grave denegaci6n de justicia., tma arbitrariedad
manifiesta, una injusticia flagrante, una completa falta de debido
proceso, una discriminacion manifiesta, o la ausencia manifiesta de
las razones para una decision. Sin embargo, debido a que el
enfoque debe ser en la conducta del Estado, la Republica de
Honduras no considera valido ni necesario hacer referencia a las
expectativas de los inversionistas para decidir si se ha violado el
nivel minimo de trato.” Railroad Development Corporation v.
Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, submission by
non-disputing state party, Honduras (January 1, 2012), paras. 9-10.

United States

“States may modify or amend their regulations to achieve legitimate
public welfare objectives and will not incur liability under customary
international law merely because such changes interfere with an
investor's ‘expectations’ about the state of regulation in a particular
sector. Regulatory action violates ‘fair and equitable treatment’ under
the minimum standard of treatment where, for example, it amounts to
a denial of justice, as that term is understood in customary
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international law, or manifest arbitrariness falling below the
international minimum standard.” TECO Guatemala Holdings LLC v.
Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/23, art. 10.20.2
submission of a non-disputing state party, United States of America
(November 23, 2012), para. 6.
“[A] claim under Article 1105 [FET/MST] would not be admissible if it
were based only on an allegation of a breach of another provision of
the NAFTA.” United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. Government of
Canada, UNICTRAL, second article 1128 submission of the United
States of America (May 13, 2002).
“Sufficiently broad State practice and opinio juris thus far have
coincided to establish minimum standards of State conduct in only a
few areas, such as the requirements to provide compensation for
expropriation; to provide full protection and security (or a minimum
level of internal security and law); and to refrain from denials of
justice. In the absence of an international law rule governing State
conduct in a particular area, a State is free to conduct its affairs as it
deems appropriate.” Apotex Holdings Inc. and Apotex Inc. v. United
States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1, counter-memorial
on merits and objections to jurisdiction of respondent United States
of America (December 14, 2012), para. 353.
“To suggest … that Article 1105 [FET/MST] provides a basis for an
investor to submit a claim under Chapter Eleven for mere frustration
of a legitimate expectation is nonsensical…. In addition to the fact
that such a claim lacks support in State practice, the consequences
of agreeing with Glamis that mere frustration of a foreign investor’s
legitimate expectations rises to the level of a customary international
law violation would be momentous…. In sum, the Tribunal should
reject the notion that the customary international law minimum
standard of treatment requires States to compensate foreign
investors merely because their expectations have been frustrated.
Glamis provides no evidence of such a rule of customary
international law and, indeed, State practice refutes it.” Glamis Gold
Ltd. v. United States of America, UNICTRAL, counter-memorial of
respondent United States of America (September 19, 2006), pp. 18084.

3.2.3






Questions for Discussion
What is your position on the meaning of the FET provision and its relationship to the MST
under customary international law?
What position(s) has your state taken in disputes?
What has been the outcome?
Has your state revised your treaty practice over time? If so, how?
Is there an opportunity for an agreed interpretation to help clarify the meaning of the MST?
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3.3

Shareholder Rights and Remedies

Many treaties expressly state that they include stocks or equity shares in their definitions of
“investments”. Based on that language, tribunals have determined that shareholders are not only able
to bring claims for direct harms to their rights as shareholders (e.g., measures taking their shares or
their voting rights), but are also able to bring claims and recover damages for government actions that
negatively impact the company in which they hold shares. These types of claims now make up a
“substantial part” of ISDS cases.36
Notably, the approach of tribunals to permit shareholders to secure recovery for harms to the company
in which they hold shares contrasts with domestic law of many countries in which shareholders are
generally not able to bring such claims. The common approach in domestic law is to provide that,
except in certain narrow and carefully defined circumstances, claims alleging and seeking relief for
harm to a company belong to the company itself. Any recovery secured by the company only reaches
shareholders after creditors and others with superior claims to the damages are paid.
By allowing shareholders to bring claims and recover damages for harms to the company in which
they hold shares, tribunals give rise to risks that




one government action can give rise to parallel claims by multiple shareholders in the same
company;
claims can be brought by foreign shareholders in a company even if the company and the
government agreed to settle the dispute; and
shareholders covered by an investment treaty will jump ahead of creditors and others who
would otherwise have the same or higher “priority” to recovery under domestic corporate law.

These outcomes threaten to broadly expand states’ exposure to litigation and liability, make it difficult
for states to ensure that settlement agreements actually dispose of claims, and can prejudice the
rights and interests of creditors, domestic shareholders, and other individuals and entities who are not
party to the investor-state arbitration. Consequently, the issue of shareholder claims and recoveries is
one that experts and international organizations such as the OECD have identified as needing greater
attention and clarification.
3.3.1

Tribunal Decisions

As one study has highlighted, there have been a significant number of cases in which “tribunals have
expressly held that shareholders can recover” for harms to the company (also described as claims for
“reflective loss”).37 The study also notes that “[a] number of commentators have described the issue of
the admissibility of shareholder claims for reflective loss in ISDS as settled law.”38
Tribunals have permitted shareholder claims for company harms by:






100% parent companies,
majority shareholders,
minority shareholders,
indirect shareholders with ultimate control, and
other indirect shareholders, such as intermediate holding companies.39

The decision on jurisdiction in Total v. Argentina is just one of many examples in which the
tribunal recognized these types of shareholder claims. It stated:
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Having found … that the assets and rights that Total claims have been injured in breach of
the BIT fall under the definition of investments under the BIT, it is immaterial that they belong
to Argentine companies in accordance with the law of Argentina.40
3.3.2

State Positions

Treaty practice
Many treaties expressly state that shares or equity interests fall within the definition of “investments”
covered by the treaty. Nevertheless, they typically do not state whether claims for harms to those
investments are limited to direct claims relating to the shares or equity interests themselves (e.g.,
revocation of shareholding or voting rights), or can extend to claims for reflective loss. (Tribunals have
interpreted that silence to include that such reflective loss claims are permitted).
There are, however, a few treaties that try to more expressly address the issue of whether and in what
circumstances shareholders can bring claims for harm to the company. The NAFTA and US-CAFTADR are notable examples. Under the NAFTA, for example, there are two separate provisions that
enable shareholders to bring claims. One, Article 1116, allows for claims by shareholders seeking
relief for harms to their own rights or interests. The second, Article 1117, permits shareholders, in
certain circumstances, to bring claims for harms to the company:
The shareholder brings the art. 1117 claim, but the company is the beneficiary of the award.
Art. 1135(2) ensures that recovery for all art. 1117 claims goes to the company rather than
the shareholder. Recovery for the company protects company creditors and all shareholders,
as derivative action mechanisms generally do under domestic law.
The claimant shareholder must own or control the company directly or indirectly to bring a
claim under art. 1117. Non-controlling shareholders cannot bring claims under art. 1117.
Where a shareholder brings an art. 1117 claim, the company is expressly prohibited from
bringing a claim on its own behalf. As noted by Meg Kinnear, this likely helps avoid the
possibility that a foreign company could make one ISDS claim while its controlling owner
makes another.
Several provisions specifically address and reduce the risk of multiple proceedings. Waiver of
claims is required as a pre-condition to bringing a claim. which largely precludes the possibility
of multiple claims. If a claim is brought under art. 1117, both the investor and the company
must waive the right to initiate or continue local proceedings (art. 1121(2)).Consolidation of
related shareholder claims under arts. 1116 and 1117 is mandated unless the tribunal finds
that a disputing party would be prejudiced.41
Submissions as respondents and as non-disputing state parties
States have also addressed the issue of shareholder claims as respondents in disputes and as nondisputing parties. Argentina, for instance, has expressly taken “the position that a shareholder cannot
bring a claim in respect of harm done to a company merely because the shareholder has been
prejudiced through a diminution in the value of the shares.”42 Similarly, Canada, Mexico and the
United States have asserted that a “minority non-controlling shareholder may not bring a claim under
the NAFTA for loss or damage incurred directly by an enterprise.”43
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3.3.3







Questions for Discussion
What are the rules in your domestic law regarding the rights of shareholders to bring claims
and seek relief for harms to the company in which they hold interests (“reflective loss” claims)?
What is your position regarding the ability of shareholders to bring ISDS claims for reflective
loss?
What position has your state taken in disputes?
What have been the outcomes?
Has your state revised your treaty practice over time? If so, how?
Is there an opportunity for an agreed interpretation to help clarify the rights of shareholders to
bring claims for reflective loss?
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Annex 1. Shaping Interpretation of Existing Treaties: The Role
of Subsequent Agreement and Subsequent Practice
Treaties are not static instruments but can evolve over time. Crucially, under the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) and customary international law on treaty interpretation, states
themselves can be important forces in shaping that evolution through their express agreement and
even unilateral conduct. This section provides an overview of relevant rules and principles of treaty
interpretation in order to highlight the potential role of states in influencing the meaning of their
investment treaties, and to guide states in how to exercise that power.
1.

General rule of treaty interpretation (VCLT Article 31)

As this section explains, the VCLT gives states an ongoing role as “masters of their treaties”, and
recognizes their ability to shape the meaning of their treaties over time.
Article 31 of the VCLT, which also applies as customary international law, provides the general rule on
treaty interpretation. It states:

Article 31, GENERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text,
including its preamble and annexes:
(a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion
with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of
the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty
or the application of its provisions;
(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement
of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.
Unless the treaty states otherwise, Article 31 is thus the first place tribunals must go when interpreting
treaty language. Article 31 specifies that, along with the text, object and purpose, tribunals need to
take into account evidence of “subsequent agreement” and “subsequent practice establishing
agreement” (collectively referred to as “subsequent agreement/practice”) on the meaning of the
treaties.44
Subsequent agreement/practice is considered to be “objective evidence of the understanding of the
parties as to the meaning of the treaty,” and an “authentic means of interpretation” that must be
applied in interpreting the relevant text.45 As the International Law Commission (ILC) has explained:
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By describing subsequent agreements and subsequent practice under article 31 (3) (a) and
(b) as
“authentic” means of interpretation [the ILC] recognizes that the common will of the parties,
from which any treaty results, possesses a specific authority regarding the identification of the
meaning of the treaty, even after the conclusion of the treaty. The Vienna Convention thereby
accords the parties to a treaty a role which may be uncommon for the interpretation of legal
instruments in some domestic legal systems.46
The term “subsequent” is important to emphasize. It refers to actions and statements after the treaty
was concluded, making post-treaty agreements and conduct crucially important to interpretation. In
contrast, evidence of intent at the time of concluding the treaty, such as evidence of negotiating
history are only “supplementary means” of interpretation that can be considered pursuant to Article 32
of the VCLT. According to Article 32 of the VCLT, such supplementary means of interpretation may be
taken into account, but only to (1) “confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31” or
(2) determine the meaning when application of Article 31 “[l]eaves the meaning ambiguous or
obscure” or “[l]eads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”47 The VCLT thus accords
states’ views of the meaning of their treaties over time a greater interpretive weight than their views of
the meaning during negotiations.
2.

What constitutes subsequent agreement/practice?

A “subsequent agreement” under VCLT Article 31(3)(a) is “an agreement between the parties,
reached after the conclusion of a treaty, regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of
its provisions.”48 It need not satisfy any requirement of formality, but should constitute some form of
“single common act by the parties by which they manifest their common understanding.”49 One
example of “subsequent agreement” is an exchange of diplomatic notes recording an agreement, or a
joint interpretive statement.
“Subsequent practice in the application of the treaty” under VCLT Article 31(3)(b) is “conduct in the
application of a treaty, after its conclusion, which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding
the interpretation of the treaty.” While it carries the same force as a “subsequent agreement” under
Article 31(3)(a), “subsequent practice” under Article 31(3)(b) may be more difficult to establish since it
is generally made up of conduct that can contribute to an agreement, but that is not embodied in one
common and relatively clear document or act.
The “conduct” that can establish subsequent practice under VCLT Article 31 consists of actions and
omissions (including silence) attributable to a party to a treaty under international law; this can include
conduct by state organs, high-ranking as well as local officials, and even non-state actors.950 As the
ILC reports, this can be broad:
[It] includes not only official acts at the international or at the internal level which serve to
apply the treaty, including to respect or to ensure the fulfillment of treaty obligations, but
also, inter alia, official statements regarding its interpretation, such as statements at a
diplomatic conference, statements in the course of a legal dispute, or judgments of domestic
courts; official communications to which the treaty gives rise; or the enactment of domestic
legislation or the conclusion of international agreements for the purpose of implementing a
treaty even before any specific act of application takes place at the internal or at the
international level.51
Not all such conduct, nor even all inter-state agreements, however, will establish subsequent
agreement/practice under Article 31. In order to constitute subsequent agreement/practice that must
be taken into account under Article 31 of the VCLT, the agreement/practice needs to be regarding the
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interpretation of a treaty.52 The clearer it is that any agreement or conduct aims to interpret or apply
the treaty, the more likely it is to be considered as subsequent agreement/practice under the VCLT.
3.

The Legal Effect of Subsequent Practice: Automatically Relevant, Potentially Binding

As noted above, Article 31(3) states that subsequent practice must be taken into account in treaty
interpretation, along with other elements such as the ordinary meaning of the treaty’s terms and its
object and character. The fact that it must be taken into account, however, does not mean that it is
“necessarily conclusive, or legally binding. Thus, when the [ILC] characterized a ‘subsequent
agreement’ as representing ‘an authentic interpretation’, it did not go quite as far as saying that such
an interpretation is necessarily conclusive in the sense that it overrides all other means of
interpretation.”53
A 2013 report of the ILC, however, recognizes that the treaty parties can give their subsequent
agreements binding force:
[S]ubsequent agreements and subsequent practice establishing the agreement of the
parties regarding the interpretation of a treaty must be conclusive regarding such
interpretation when “the parties consider the interpretations to be binding upon them”.54
The intent of the parties to give interpretations such binding effect is particularly clear when the treaty
itself says that subsequent interpretive agreements entered into by the treaty parties will be binding
upon them and/or those interpreting and applying the treaty.55
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Annex 2. Draft Conclusions of ILC on Subsequent Agreement
and Subsequent Practice
Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties
Text of draft conclusions 1–5 provisionally adopted by the Drafting Committee at the sixty-fifth session
of the International Law Commission
Draft conclusion 1
General rule and means of treaty interpretation
1. Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties set forth,
respectively, the general rule of interpretation and the rule on supplementary means of interpretation.
These rules also apply as customary international law.
2. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its
terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
3. Article 31, paragraph 3, provides, inter alia, that there shall be taken into account, together with the
context, (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty
or the application of its provisions; and (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.
4. Recourse may be had to other subsequent practice in the application of the treaty as a
supplementary means of interpretation under article 32.
5. The interpretation of a treaty consists of a single combined operation, which places appropriate
emphasis on the various means of interpretation indicated, respectively, in articles 31 and 32.
Draft conclusion 2
Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice as authentic means of interpretation
Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice under article 31 (3) (a) and (b), being objective
evidence of the understanding of the parties as to the meaning of the treaty, are authentic means of
interpretation, in the application of the general rule of treaty interpretation reflected in article 31.
Draft conclusion 3
Interpretation of treaty terms as capable of evolving over time
Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice under articles 31 and 32 may assist in determining
whether or not the presumed intention of the parties upon the conclusion of the treaty was to give a
term used a meaning which is capable of evolving over time.
Draft conclusion 4
Definition of subsequent agreement and subsequent practice
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1. A “subsequent agreement” as an authentic means of interpretation under article 31 (3) (a) is an
agreement between the parties, reached after the conclusion of a treaty, regarding the interpretation of
the treaty or the application of its provisions.
2. A “subsequent practice” as an authentic means of interpretation under article 31 (3) (b) consists of
conduct in the application of a treaty, after its conclusion, which establishes the agreement of the
parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty.
3. Other “subsequent practice” as a supplementary means of interpretation under article 32 consists of
conduct by one or more parties in the application of the treaty, after its conclusion.
Draft conclusion 5
Attribution of subsequent practice
1. Subsequent practice under articles 31 and 32 may consist of any conduct in the application of a
treaty which is attributable to a party to the treaty under international law.
2. Other conduct, including by non-State actors, does not constitute subsequent practice under articles
31 and 32. Such conduct may, however, be relevant when assessing the subsequent practice of
parties to a treaty.
Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties
Texts and titles of draft conclusions 6 to 10 provisionally adopted by the Drafting Committee on 27 and
28 May and on 2 and 3 June 2014
Draft Conclusion 6
Identification of subsequent agreements and subsequent practice
1. The identification of subsequent agreements and subsequent practice under article 31, paragraph
3, requires, in particular, a determination whether the parties, by an agreement or a practice, have
taken a position regarding the interpretation of the treaty. This is not normally the case if the parties
have merely agreed not to apply the treaty temporarily or agreed to establish a practical arrangement
(modus vivendi).
2. Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice under article 31, paragraph 3, can take a variety
of forms.
3. The identification of subsequent practice under article 32 requires, in particular, a determination
whether conduct by one or more parties is in the application of the treaty.
Draft Conclusion 7
Possible effects of subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in interpretation
1. Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice under article 31, paragraph 3,
contribute, in their interaction with other means of interpretation, to the clarification of the meaning of a
treaty. This may result in narrowing, widening, or otherwise determining the range of possible
interpretations, including any scope for the exercise of discretion which the treaty accords to the
parties.
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2. Subsequent practice under article 32 can also contribute to the clarification of the meaning of a
treaty.
3. It is presumed that the parties to a treaty, by an agreement subsequently arrived at or a practice in
the application of the treaty, intend to interpret the treaty, not to amend or to modify it. The possibility
of amending or modifying a treaty by subsequent practice of the parties has not been generally
recognized. The present draft conclusion is without prejudice to the rules on the amendment or
modification of treaties under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and under customary
international law.
Draft Conclusion 8
Weight of subsequent agreements and subsequent practice as a means of interpretation
1. The weight of a subsequent agreement or subsequent practice as a means of interpretation under
article 31, paragraph 3, depends, inter alia, on its clarity and specificity.
2. The weight of subsequent practice under article 31, paragraph 3 (b), depends, in addition, on
whether and how it is repeated.
3. The weight of subsequent practice as a supplementary means of interpretation under article 32 may
depend on the criteria referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2.
Draft Conclusion 9
Agreement of the parties regarding the interpretation of a treaty
1. An agreement under article 31, paragraph 3 (a) and (b), requires a common understanding
regarding the interpretation of a treaty which the parties are aware of and accept. Though it shall be
taken into account, such an agreement need not be legally binding.
2. The number of parties that must actively engage in subsequent practice in order to establish an
agreement under article 31, paragraph 3 (b), may vary. Silence on the part of one or more parties can
constitute acceptance of the subsequent practice when the circumstances call for some reaction.
Draft Conclusion 10
Decisions adopted within the framework of a Conference of States Parties
1. A Conference of States Parties, under these draft conclusions, is a meeting of States parties
pursuant to a treaty for the purpose of reviewing or implementing the treaty, except if they act as
members of an organ of an international organization.
2. The legal effect of a decision adopted within the framework of a Conference of States Parties
depends primarily on the treaty and any applicable rules of procedure. Depending on the
circumstances, such a decision may embody, explicitly or implicitly, a subsequent agreement under
article 31, paragraph 3 (a), or give rise to subsequent practice under article 31, paragraph 3 (b), or to
subsequent practice under article 32. Decisions adopted within the framework of a Conference of
States Parties often provide a nonexclusive range of practical options for implementing the treaty.
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3. A decision adopted within the framework of a Conference of States Parties embodies a subsequent
agreement or subsequent practice under article 31, paragraph 3, in so far as it expresses agreement
in substance between the parties regarding the interpretation of a treaty, regardless of the form and
the procedure by which the decision was adopted, including by consensus.
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Annex 3. Excerpt from OECD Roundtable on Freedom of
Investment 19 (15-16 October 2013)
Part IV. Investment treaties over time – Treaty practice and interpretation in a changing world
FOI began their discussions of this subject by noting that investment treaty law, like all systems of law,
embodies a tension between stability and flexibility. Stability nurtures predictability and compliance,
while flexibility helps legal systems stay aligned with changing circumstances and evolving needs. A
background paper prepared by the Secretariat reviews treaty partners’ options as they attempt to find
the right balance between stability and flexibility and to ensure that their intentions are as clear to
arbitration panels who interpret treaties and others (e.g. investors) who might want to use the treaties
for dispute settlement. These options were divided into two categories – ‘exit’ and ‘voice’.
Exit involves the radical move of leaving the treaty system entirely (e.g. by renunciation of treaties),
thereby eliminating the need for treaty interpretation. The background paper found the following in
relation to exit as an option for treaty partners:



Exit is rare, at least for now. To date, unilateral exit from investment treaty obligations has
been exceptionally rare, with only ten treaties known to have been terminated unilaterally.
Investment treaties lock state parties into obligations for extended periods of time. In order to
investigate how long treaty commitments last, the Secretariat ran a simulation using a scenario
of immediate and unilateral termination all of the 1900 treaties in the FOI treaty sample as
soon as such termination is permitted under the treaty. The simulation uses as inputs more
than 2000 treaties’ provisions on validity periods (these prohibit unilateral termination by treaty
partners for a fixed period of time) and survival clauses (which extend certain treaty protections
for specified – usually already made – investments). The simulation shows:
o Long survival periods for investment treaty obligations. Ninety per cent of the treaties in
the sample would continue to have some binding effect until at least 2024 – that is, at
least some investments would continue to benefit from protections provided under the
treaties until that date. Thus, investment treaties appear, on average, to provide for
significant stability in treaty- based protections for covered investors via their validity
and survival clauses.
o Expanding potential for treaty renunciation. The scope for legal, unilateral renunciation
of treaties is now high. Simulations run by the Secretariat show that two thirds of
treaties in the sample could be unilaterally terminated within a year’s time – that is, by
the end of 2014.

The second option explored in the Secretariat background paper for countries influencing investment
treaty interpretation is ‘voice’. Voice refers to the use by treaty partners of unilateral or multilateral
tools to influence the use and interpretation of their investment treaties. The paper examines treaty
parties’ options for voice and maps relevant treaty practice and produces the following findings.




Options for voice are numerous. Options for voice include: crafting of clear treaty language
during negotiations, amicus curiae filings for ISDS cases, other evidence of state practice such
as model treaties, authoritative interpretations and other statements clarifying the meaning of
treaty provisions, treaty amendments and protocols and treaty replacement through
renegotiation.
Silence is the dominant approach. The survey of treaty practice shows that by far the most
common approach is silence on partners’ options for influencing treaty interpretation.
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Very few countries avail themselves of their options for voice. Although there are a large range
of options for exercising voice, recourse to these options appears to be numerically small. Very
few countries provide for filings by non-respondent treaty partners during ISDS proceedings
and for authoritative interpretations by treaty partners of treaty texts – fewer than 1 per cent of
the total treaty sample in both cases and these few cases tend to involve at least one signatory
locate in the Americas.
Treaty renegotiation is rare. A survey of investment treaty replacement through renegotiation
shows that this is also very rare. However, renegotiation of treaties has, to a limited extent,
made treaties both more detailed and more similar to one another. Participants in FOI
Roundtable 19 made a number of points about exit and voice in an investment law context:
Silence may be golden. One country stated its view that governments should use their treaties
to establish principles that guide treaty interpretation, but, once ratified, countries should
abstain from intervening. Such intervention, under this perspective, looks like de facto
amendment of the investment treaty. In this countries’ view, the key is to develop clear treaty
drafting from the outset in order to preserve government neutrality in the dispute resolution
process. Thus, with respect to opportunities to participate in ongoing interpretations, this
country generally prefers to maintain silence so as to preserve neutrality. Clarity of treaty
drafting is a cornerstone for an effective system of investment treaty law. A number of
countries stressed the importance of clear drafting of treaties. One country noted that it had
consistently made use of voice mechanism, clarifying the state interpretation on the content of
many treaties and stated that this practice should become more widespread. Another country
offered the view that longer and more detailed treaties are not necessarily clearer treaties.
Legal certainty (e.g. through clear treaty drafting) can be difficult to achieve since not all
scenarios can be anticipated. Some FOI participants highlighted the limits to how much clear
treaty drafting can help in producing more predictable treaty interpretations. They identified a
number of difficulties. First, it is difficult or even impossible to foresee all of the legal issues that
are likely to arise as a treaty is used by investors, arbitrators and counsel. One country clearly
expressed skepticism that treaty drafting could reasonably be expected to provide a sufficient
level of legal certainty for state parties and concluded that some amount of subsequent
interpretation (post-ratification) is likely to be necessary. Another country noted that it exports
capital to one group of countries, but imports it from another group of countries. While this
country proposes one model to all negotiating partners, it is not confident that all issues that
might arise – either for its investors as claimants or for its government in responding to claims
– are covered in its treaties and model.

Different treaty practice for FTAs and BITs. One country noted that it had replaced some of its BITS
with FTA with investment chapters. Treaty practice for FTAs are substantially different than the
treaties they replaced.
Clarifying the relationship between older treaties with older language and treaty interpretation. One
country noted that, if countries have lots of treaties, fixing one treaty (e.g. through re-negotiation)
cannot be expected to solve problems of interpretation because the interpretation of the other treaties
is unaffected.
Another representative advanced the view that it is a pity that States are not more active in influencing
how their treaties are interpreted, since they are the major actors in the investment law ‘system’– both
as treaty drafters and respondents to treaty based investor claims. This participant wondered with
government silence on this matter was not due to either a lack of ability and capacity of states to
participate in dialogue on investment treaty law.
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Request for more work on state-to-state consultations on treaty application. One country asked the
Secretariat to extend its survey treaty provisions to cover treaty texts that call for state-to-state
consultations on how treaty language establishing special treatment of prudential, financial, tax
measures in the context of the treaty. If the respondent invokes some of these areas as a defense,
then the proceedings are suspended and the treaty partners attempt to reach an agreement on
whether the special provision applies (e.g. whether the measure is a prudential measures).
The importance of encouraging UNCITRAL transparency rules, was noted. In particular, some FOI
participants emphasized the value of providing non-disputing parties (e.g. home-states) with the right
to make submissions to ISDS proceedings. As the modified rules may become retroactive, they may in
the future cover more than 1% of the treaties (the percentage of Secretariat treaty sample that provide
for submissions by respondents).
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Annex 4. Analysis of Treaties Concluded and Investors
and Investments That Are Covered
1.

Quantity of Investment Covered

An important starting point for an assessment of risks is an assessment of the treaties that
are in force, and with whom; this enables countries to begin to understand the investors and
investments that are covered based on FDI between the countries. For a number of reasons,
however, this assessment likely underestimates exposure.
One reason is that, due to treaty shopping and the use of corporate networks, investors
have various options for securing treaty coverage over any given investment. A treaty with
one home state can, depending on the language of the treaty, provide coverage for
parents/beneficial owners and subsidiaries located in states not party to the treaty. Data on
FDI between two countries can thus fail to capture the full amount of capital flows that are
effectively covered by the treaty.56
Additionally, given the wide range of “assets” that are often covered under the definition of
an “investment”, claimants can bring actions for a range of holdings that would not be
captured in data on FDI or in data on other types of capital flows.57 Moreover, many of these
assets – such as securities traded on international markets – are often highly liquid and
transferrable, meaning that the amount of assets covered by a treaty can change quickly
and without the knowledge of the host state, making exposure even more difficult to assess
or control.
2.

Variety of Potential Claimants

While data on the amount of foreign investment covered by investment treaties helps
government assess the overall amount of potential liability that can arise from international
law claims, there is another important issue that needs to be addressed: namely, the
number of claimants that can bring claims alleging that their “investments” had been
harmed. Under current interpretations of investment treaties, governments may face
independent treaty claims from a number of different investors (under the same or different
treaties) relating to an investment in just one project or enterprise. Even foreign minority
non-controlling shareholders have been able to bring claims alleging harm to the company
in which they invested, even if the company is majority owned and/or controlled by domestic
investors or investors from third states. As noted above in Section 3.3, this exposes states
to risks that multiple claims will be brought relating to the same measure and set of facts.
For host states, this potential for multiple claims raises a number of significant problems
including increased litigation costs and increased chances for the investors to prevail and
the state to lose.
3. Sector
On a global level, the majority of investment disputes arise in the primary/extractive
industries and services sectors.58 Foreign investment in manufacturing is less likely to give
rise to disputes. Comparing these patterns regarding claims with patterns regarding the
amount of FDI in the three different sectors reveals that there is a disproportionately high
number of disputes in the extractive industries relative to the amount of FDI that goes into
that sector, and a disproportionately low number of claims relating to manufacturing as
compared to the amount of FDI in manufacturing.
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practice and evolutive interpretation: Techniques of treaty interpretation over time and their diverse
consequences,” 9 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 443 (2010), n.450. See
also, e.g., Anthea Roberts, “Power and persuasion in investment treaty interpretation: The dual role of
states,” 104 American Journal of International Law 179-225 (2010), pp. 200-201.
4
Decisions rejecting the claimant’s attempt to import more favorable dispute resolution provisions
include ICS v. Argentina (importation to bypass 18-month litigation requirement not allowed); Daimler
v. Argentina (importation to bypass the 18-month litigation requirement not allowed); Wintershall v.
Argentina (same); Plama v. Bulgaria (importation to permit access to ICSID arbitration not allowed);
Salini v. Jordan (ssame).
5
Other decisions reaching conclusions similar to those in Telenor and Tza Yap Shum include the
majority decision in Austrian Airlines v. Slovakia (but see dissenting opinion of Judge Brower, the
majority decision in Renta4 v. Russia (but see dissenting opinion of Judge Brower), and Bershader v.
Russia (but see dissenting opinion by Todd Grierson)).
6
This note in the negotiating history is quoted in Andreas R. Ziegler, “The Nascent International Law
on Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties,” in European Yearbook of
International Economic Law (2010), 77-101, p. 93.
7
Colombia-Switzerland BIT, Ad Article 4, para. 2(2) (emphasis added).
8
TPP Draft, January 20, 2015, Investment Chapter, Art II.5(3).
9
CETA, Article X.7(4) (emphasis added).
10
In some cases, states have not taken a strong position. MTD v. Chile is an example. There, the
tribunal stated:
The Claimants have based in part their claims on provisions of other bilateral investment treaties and
have alleged that these provisions apply by operation of the MFN clause of the BIT. The Respondent
has not argued against the application of these provisions but, in the case of Article 3(1) of the
Denmark BIT and Article 3(3) and (4) of the bilateral investment treaty between Chile and Croatia
(“the Croatia BIT”), the Respondent has qualified its arguments by stating that, even in the event that
the clause concerned would apply, the facts of the case are such that it would not have been
breached. Because of this qualification in the Counter-Memorial and the Rejoinder, the Tribunal
considers it appropriate to examine the MFN clause in the BIT and satisfy itself that its terms permit
the use of the provisions of the Denmark BIT and Croatia BIT as a legal basis for the claims submitted
to its decision.
MTD v. Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, May 25, 2004, para. 100.
11
EDF et al. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23, Award, June 11, 2012, para. 216.
12
Guarachi v. Bolivia, Award, January 31, 2014, para. 326.
13
Perenco v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Decision on Jurisdiction, June 30, 2011, para. 79
(internal citations omitted).
14
Apotex Holdings and Apotex Inc. v. United States, Award, August 25, 2014, para. 9.71.
15
Philip Morris Brands et al. v. Uruguay, Uruguay’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, September 24, 2011,
para. 97.
16
UNCTAD, Series on International Investment Agreements II: FET, p. 43 (2012).
17
Glamis Gold v. United States, UNCITRAL, Award, June 8, 2009, para. 616.
18
Cargill v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, para. 103.
19
Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 38(1)(b).
20
Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 1:
Rules (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. xlv (citing International Law Association, Final Report of
the Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) International Law, Statement of Principles
Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law, Report of the Sixty-Ninth
Conference, London, 2000, commentary (b) to Principle 12, p. 731).
21
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, May 22, 2007, para. 258.
22
ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, August 20, 2007, para. 7.4.7.
23
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57

In light of the relevance of the amount of foreign investment to exposure to claims, Figures 1 and 2
show the amount of FDI stock in South and Central American countries, respectively. Figures 2 and 3
illustrate the amount of FDI stock as a percentage of domestic GDP in South and Central American
countries.
58
See UNCTAD, IIA Issues Note: Recent Trends in IIAs and ISDS, No. 1 (February 2015), p. 7
(“About 61 per cent of cases filed in 2014 relate to the services sector. Primary industries account for
28 per cent of new cases while the remaining eleven per cent arose out of investments in
manufacturing. Looking at the industries in which investments were made, the most numerous was
generation and supply of electric energy (at least eleven cases), followed by oil, gas and mining (ten),
construction (five) and financial services (three).”). See also ICSID, The ICSID Caseload – Statistics
(Issue 2012-2), p. 12 (showing sectoral distribution of all cases under the ICSID Convention and
under the Additional Facility Rules).
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